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Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact of oil shocks on the GDP  in CEMAC 
countries. We use a panel VAR model approach to the variation of the real GDP growth, oil 
price inflation rate and money supply between 2000 and 2015. Our main results show that 
CEMAC countries mostly depend on oil rent. Consequently, the analysis of impulsion 
response functions and the Variance Decompositions show that, the shock on oil price 
negatively affects the growth rate of the GDP. We then suggest CEMAC countries to 
diversify their production, the destination of their exports and the sources of Government 
budget receipts or takings.  
Key words: oil shock, GDP, Panel VAR 
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I- Introduction 
Since 2014, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) faces at the 
same time several types of shocks: securities (terrorist threats), politics (political crisis) and 
falling prices of natural resources. Concerning the persistent fall in the cost of natural 
resources,  principally oil, started since June 2014, the cost of barrel passed from  more than 
100 US $, to less than 50 US $. Consequently, the economic growth curve in the zone follows 
a fall starting from 4.8 % in 2014 to 2.4 % in 2015, and in 2016, it is forecast at 1% . 
The relation between oil price variables and the principal macroeconomic indicators was 
already the subject of numerous theoretical and empirical studies (Hamilton, (1983, 1988, 
1996, 2003), Rasche and Tatom (1981), Mork (1989), Hooker (1996). This dynamic interest 
at the same time academicians, policy decision-makers, the actors of finance and of the civil 
society since the first crisis of oil triggered in 1970. So, a series of dramatic events in the 
1970s sent the price of crude oil over $40 a barrel by the end of that decade, which would be 
over $100 a barrel at current prices. The price remained very volatile after the collapse in the 
1980s but was still as low as $20 a barrel at the end of 2001 (Hamilton, 2009). After 2005, the 
barrel price remained above $60 despite the strong volatility. But since the fall in August 
2014, the barrel price dropped below $60 in March 2015 and is maintained until now. The 
consequences of this strong decrease are dynamic for the exporting countries, in particular 
those of the CEMAC zone. 
Figure 1 : Evolution of barrel price of January 1990. 
 
Source: INSEE 
This real decrease in barrel price influence the decisions of budgetary and monetary policies 
in function of the weight of the oil returns in the gross domestic product and the budgetary 
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returns. It is in this light that Copinschi (2015) brings out the weight of the oil rent in the 
Gross domestic product and the budgetary returns of CEMAC countries. Thus, in Cameroon, 
it is observed that the returns from oil represents 10% of Gross Domestic Product, 20% of the 
budget and represent 50% of export returns for a production of 75 000 barrel/d. In Congo, oil 
returns represents 50% of Gross Domestic Product, 75% of budgetary returns and 80% of 
export returns for a production of 281 000 barrel/d. In Gabon, oil returns represent 45% of 
Gross Domestic Product, 50% of budgetary returns and 70% of export returns for a 
production of 236 000 barrel/d. In Equatorial Guinea, oil returns represent 85% of Gross 
National Product, 85% of budgetary returns and 90% of export returns for a production of 
281 000 barrel/d.   
Table 1 : Relative Size of Economies and Importance of Oil Sector, 2015 
 
Source: IMF Country Report N° 16/290 
Thus, in the IMF Country Report N° 16//277, it is shown that CEMAC growth was subdued 
in 2015. It slowed to 1.6 percent, from 4.9 percent in 2014, because of reduced public 
investment and lower oil production. Growth is projected to be 1.9 percent in 2016, as oil 
production and investment remain sluggish. From 2017 onward, growth is expected to reach 
3½ percent a year, as oil prices gradually recover, some one percentage point below the 
average growth level of the past decade of high oil prices. Growth of money and credit to the 
economy turned negative in 2015 for the first time in a decade, contributing to keeping 
inflation low. The regional fiscal and current account deficits grew to 6 and 9 percent of GDP 
in 2015, respectively, as oil export proceeds fell by 32 percent. Continued low oil prices and 
high public expenditure will contribute to maintaining both deficits at about 6 and 8 percent of 
GDP in 2016, respectively.  
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Figure 2 : Real GDP Growth, 2013-2015 
 
Source 1 : IMF country Report n° 16/277 
Faced with the fall in oil returns, all countries of the region have, in the course of the year 
2015, strongly reduce their public expenditures on investment, what aggravates the slowing 
effect of the economy by impacting the non-oil activity sectors but of which the financing 
greatly depends on oil returns (construction, etc.). Gabon and Congo has announced the 
important adjustments in the public expenditures and Cameroon has to follow. But it is in 
Equatorial Guinea that the recadrage is most severe: the amount of public investments for the 
year 2015 will experience a fall of close to 60% with respect to the previous year. Besides, the 
fall in foreign investments in the oil sector of these countries will equally have a negative 
impact on the growth of this year.    
Considering this background, we study the macroeconomic dynamics between economic 
output growth, domestic price level, money supply and oil price over a set of CEMAC 
countries. To evaluate the relative importance of these variables in the movements of other 
variables in both short and long run, Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) and Forecast Error 
Variance Decompositions (FEVDs) are used. 
II- Litteral Review 
1- world 
Many authors concentrated on analyzing the oil price-macroeconomic relationship (Hamilton, 
(1983, 1988, 1996, 2003), Rasche and Tatom (1981), Mork (1989), Hooker (1996) ) The main 
results of the paper may be summarized as follows. Firstly, the linear (symmetric) oil price 
specification reveals that changes in oil price stimulate GDP growth in the short term, but 
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cause GDP to decline in the long term. Secondly, for non-linear (asymmetric) specifications, 
positive oil price shocks cause GDP to decline in the long term without experiencing growth 
in the short term. Another interesting finding is the response of output growth to negative 
(decreasing) oil price changes. Using negative oil price shock measures, GDP responds 
negatively in the short term, but eventually recovers although responses in the long term are 
not statistically significant (Aziz and Dahala (2015), Basnet and Upadhyaya (2015)) 
Ozturk (2015) analyzes the impact of oil price shocks on the selected macroeconomic 
variables in Turkey for the period of 1990Q1-2011Q4. Vector Auto regression (VAR) models 
and bivariate Granger causality tests are applied to determine the oil price shocks - 
macroeconomic relationship. The empirical findings shows that both symmetric and positive 
oil price shocks decrease industrial production, money supply, and imports while the negative 
oil price shocks increase imports.  
Baumeister and Peersman (2013) Using time-varying BVARs, we find a substantial decline in 
the short run price elasticity of oil demand since the mid 1980s. This finding helps explain 
why an oil production shortfall of the same magnitude is associated with a stronger response 
of oil prices and more severe macroeconomic consequences over time, while a similar oil 
price increase is associated with smaller output effects. Oil supply shocks also account for a 
smaller fraction of real oil price variability in more recent periods, in contrast to oil demand 
shocks. The overall effects of oil supply disruptions on the US economy have, however, been 
modest. 
Lutz (2008) A comparison of the effects of exogenous shocks to global crude oil production 
on seven major industrialized economies suggests a fair degree of similarity in the real growth 
responses. An exogenous oil supply disruption typically causes a temporary reduction in real 
GDP growth that is concentrated in the second year after the shock. Inflation responses are 
more varied. The median CPI inflation response peaks after three to four quarters. Exogenous 
oil supply disruptions need not generate sustained inflation or stagflation. Typical responses 
include a fall in the real wage, higher short-term interest rates, and a depreciating currency 
with respect to the dollar. Despite many qualitative similarities, there is strong statistical 
evidence that the responses to exogenous oil supply disruptions differ across G7 countries.  
Aziz and Dahalan (2015) investigates the asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on real 
economic activities in ASEAN-5 from 1991 to 2014 using an unrestricted panel Vector Auto 
Regressive (VAR) method. Results from the impulse response function (IRFs) shows 
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evidence of an asymmetric relationship between oil prices and economic activities. 
Specifically, positive oil price shock measures negatively affect output growth both in the 
short term and in the long term. For oil price decrease specifications, real output responds 
negatively in the short term before recovering to its pre-shock level in the long term. The 
variance decomposition analysis (VDCs) also exhibit differences between the effects of 
positive and negative oil price shocks on economic activities, supporting the evidence of 
asymmetric relationship obtained in the IRFs simulations. 
Brémond and al. (2014) study the relations between the price of oil and a large dataset of 
commodity prices, relying on panel data settings. Using second generation panel co-
integration tests, our findings show that the WTI and commodity prices are not linked in the 
long term. Nevertheless, considering our results in causality tests, they show that short-run 
relations exist, mainly from the price of crude oil to commodity prices. We thus implement a 
Panel VAR estimation with an impulse response function analysis. Two main conclusions 
emerge: (i) fast co-movements are highlighted, while (ii) market efficiency is emphasized. 
Blanchard and Gali (2007) characterize the macroeconomic performance of a set of 
industrialized economies in the aftermath of the oil price shocks of the 1970s and of the last 
decade, focusing on the differences across episodes. We examine four different hypotheses 
for the mild effects on inflation and economic activity of the recent increase in the price of oil: 
(a) good luck (i.e. lack of concurrent adverse shocks), (b) smaller share of oil in production, 
(c) more flexible labour markets, and (d) improvements in monetary policy. We conclude that 
all four have played an important role. 
Cologni and Manera (2009) using a Markov-switching analysis for the G-7 countries show 
that positive oil price changes, net oil price increases and oil price volatility tend to have a 
greater impact on output growth. Moreover, their analysis suggests that the role of oil shocks 
in explaining recessionary episodes have decreased over time. Finally, they conclude that oil 
shocks tend to be asymmetric. 
Hamilton (2008) explores similarities and differences between the run-up of oil prices in 
2007–08 and earlier oil price shocks, looking at what caused these price increases and what 
effects they had on the economy. Whereas previous oil price shocks were primarily caused by 
physical disruptions of supply, the price run-up of 2007–08 was caused by strong demand 
confronting stagnating world production. Although the causes were different, the 
consequences for the economy appear to have been similar to those observed in earlier 
episodes, with significant effects on consumption spending and purchases of domestic 
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automobiles in particular. Absent those declines, it is unlikely that the period 2007Q4–
2008Q3 would have been characterized as one of recession for the United States. This episode 
should thus be added to the list of U.S. recessions to which oil prices appear to have made a 
material contribution. 
Mehrara and Mohaghegh (2011) study the macroeconomic dynamics in oil exporting 
countries using Panel VAR approach. On the basis of Impulse Response and Variance 
Decompositions analysis in a system included economic output, money supply, price index 
and oil price, we found that: (1) oil shocks are not necessarily inflationary; (2) money is not 
neutral in these countries; (3) money is the main cause of macroeconomic fluctuations; (4) oil 
shocks significantly affect economic output and money supply; (5) though oil price is highly 
driven by its own shocks, domestic shocks, particularly output and money shocks, can sizably 
affect oil price in the world market. 
2- Africa 
Nchor and al (2016) analysis effect of oil price shocks on the Ghanian economy. This is 
achieved through the use of Vector Autoregressive (VAR) and Vector Error Correction 
(VECM) models. The variables considered in the study include: real oil price, real 
government expenditure, real industry value added, real imports, inflation and the real 
effective exchange rate. The study points out the asymmetric effects of oil price shocks; for 
instance, positive as well as negative oil price shocks on the macroeconomic variables used. 
The empirical findings of this study suggest that both linear and nonlinear oil price shocks 
have adverse impact on macroeconomic variables in Ghana. Positive oil price shocks are 
stronger than negative shocks with respect to government expenditure, inflation and the real 
effective exchange rate. Industry value added and imports have stronger responses to negative 
oil price shocks.  
Sanchez (2011) analyzed the welfare eﬀects of rising oil prices in oil-importing countries 
using dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model on six oil-importing counties 
(Bangladesh, El Salvador, Kenya, Nicaragua, Tanzania, and Thailand) for the period 1990–
2008. He argues that oil price rise has signiﬁcant adverse impact on GDP with an average 
annual GDP loss varying from 0.1% for Tanzania to 20% for Kenya. 
Akinleye and Ekpo (2013) examine the macroeconomic implications of symmetric and 
asymmetric oil price and oil revenue shocks in Nigeria, using the vector autoregressive (var) 
estimation technique. The paper finds that both positive and negative oil price shocks 
influence real government expenditure only in the long run rather than in the short run, while 
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examining positive and negative shocks to external reserves revealed stronger implications for 
expenditure in the long run, with positive rather than negative oil price shocks having stronger 
short and long run effects on real GDP, and therefore triggering inflationary pressure and 
domestic currency depreciation as importation rises. 
Apere and Ijomah (2013) investigates the time-series relationship on the impact of oil price 
volatility on macroeconomic activity in Nigeria using exponential generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity (EGARCH), impulse response function and lag-augmented 
VAR (LA-VAR) models. We found evidence that there is a unidirectional relationship exists 
between the interest rate, exchange rate and oil prices, with the direction from oil prices to 
both exchange rate and the interest rate. However, a significant relationship between oil prices 
and real GDP was not found. 
Berument et al. (2010) in a study on Middle East and North African countries found the 
asymmetric effects of world oil price shocks on the GDP of Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia, and UAE to be positive and statistically significant, while 
positive but insignificant results were reported for Bahrain, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and 
Yemen. 
III- METHODOLOGY 
To investigate the sources of macroeconomics fluctuations in CEMAC countries, specifically 
in Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea, with Panel VAR model.  
Times series Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) models originate in the macro econometrics 
literature as an alternative to multivariate simultaneous equation models (Sims, 1980). In 
VAR models all variables are treated as endogenous and interdependent, both in a dynamic 
and in static sense, although in some relevant cases, exogenous variables could be included 
(Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013). Panel VAR have the same structure as VAR models, in the 
sense that all variable are assumed to be endogenous and interdependent, but cross sectional 
dimension is added to the representation (Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013).  
Panel VAR have been used to address a variety of issues of interest to applied 
macroeconomists and policymakers.  Bremond and al. (2014) studies the link between oil and 
Commodity prices with a panel VAR approach, Mehrara and Mohaghgeh (2011) studies the 
macroeconomic dynamics in oil exporting countries using Panel VAR approach. 
      III-1- Data 
This paper uses four macroeconomics variables including real GDP growth, real oil prices, 
consumer index, and Supply money. Annually data from 2000 to 2015 is used for the 
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CEMAC countries. All data gathered from World Development indicator (WDI) database, but 
oil price of INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques) in France. 
      III-2- Model specification 
To explore the importance of heterogeneities, dynamics, and simultaneous determination of 
oil price, real GDP growth, consumer index, Money Supply.  We begin with the following 
baseline panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) specification (Bremond and al. 2014): 
          ( )          
Where i indicate the country, t runs from 1 to T, Yit is the vector of endogenous variables,      
is the vector of errors terms,   is the country-group specific intercept matrix, and  ( ) is the 
matrix polynomial in the lag operator. The estimation is by generalized method of moment 
(GMM). 
(                                   )  
Where I denote the individual dimension composed by CEMAC country, and t=2000, …2015 
the time. GGDPit, oil priceit, INFLit, and M2it, denote real GDP growth, oil price, consumer 
index, Money Supply. 
IV- Results 
1- Data description, Unit Root, stability tests and cointegration test 
1.1.Unit Root  
Annexes 1 provide the unit root regression results of the variables entered in the model. We 
find that oil price, gross domestic product growth and money supply are stationary in first 
difference. Inflation is stationary at level.   
1.2.Stability test 
All the eigen values lie inside the unit circle, Panel Var satisfies stability condition. 
 
Tableau 2: Stability test 
 
 
 
Eigenvalue Modulus 
Real  Imaginary 
 .8506035  -.2951372 .9003512 
.8506035 .2951372  .9003512 
 .4237051 0 .4237051 
.0265475 0 .0265475 
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2. Panel VAR estimation 
From our estimations, the GDP growth rate is negatively influenced by the price of oil and 
positively influenced by the level of inflation and money supply. Inflation is positively 
influenced by the price of oil and negatively by the money supply.  
    
3. Impulse Response Function (IRF) Analysis 
It is brought out of the functional analysis of impulse response that, the shocks on the prix of 
oil, on inflation and on money supply weakly contribute to fluctuations of the GDP growth 
rate. But, the shocks on the price of oil contributes more than the others. It is the main 
macroeconomic variable which influences the fluctuations of the GDP growth rate. From 
observations, the growth rate of NDP reacts to the shock as from the first periods. Later on, it 
starts stabilizing after the 5
th 
period.  
It should also be noticed that, the shock in oil price strongly contributes to the fluctuation of 
money supply. This is currently observed in the strong reduction of liquidity in the BEAC 
zone. Inflation is also influenced by the fluctuations of oil price but slightly less than the 
money supply. 
Figure 3 : Impulse Response Function (IRF) 
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4- Variance Decompositions 
The analysis of the Variance Decompositions shows that at the first period, the fluctuation of 
the GDP growth rate do not depend only on the lag value of this growth rate and of the oil 
price. The other factors contribute to the fluctuations in growth rate as from the 2
th
 period. For 
the rest of the periods, the contribution sum of inflation rates and money supply remains 
inferior to the contribution of oil price.  
 
V- Conclusion 
It comes from our previous analysis that, the CEMAC countries greatly depend on oil rent. In 
2015, oil rent represented 4,7% of the GDP of Cameroon, 20% of the GDP of Chad, 40% of 
the GDP of Congo, 30% of the GDP of Equatorial Guinea and 31,8% of the GDP of Gabon. 
In a general manner, the oil rent represents 19,6% of the GDP of the CEMAC zone. 
Functional analysis of impulsional response and of the decomposition of the variance shows 
that, the shock on oil price, negatively affects the GDP growth rate. And this shock affects 
even more inflation and money supply. Moreover, the Variance Decompositions shows that, 
the shock on the oil price contributes more to fluctuations of the Gross Domestic Product than 
the inflation rate and money supply. In terms of policy recommendations, we then suggest, (i) 
to put in place a mechanism of sharing risk towards the exogenous shocks within CEMAC, 
(ii) reducing the dependency on the exportation of raw material, and densifying the intra 
CEMAC trade, (iii) diversifying the productions and the destinations of exportations, (iv) 
diversifying the sources of Government budget receipts, (v) reducing heterogeneities in order 
to render monetary policies more efficient. 
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Annexes: 
Annexe 1: Unit root test 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(GGDP)   
Date: 12/20/16   Time: 15:01  
Sample: 2000 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individualeffects, individuallinear trends 
User-specifiedlags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.35244  0.0000  5  65 
Breitung t-stat -6.34317  0.0000  5  60 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.76021  0.0000  5  65 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  37.9061  0.0000  5  65 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  89.3865  0.0000  5  70 
     
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  INFL   
Date: 12/20/16   Time: 20:00  
Sample: 2000 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individualeffects 
User-specifiedlags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
          
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.12108  0.0000  5  67 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
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Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -3.79980  0.0001  5  67 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  32.9844  0.0003  5  67 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  55.8292  0.0000  5  72 
          
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(OIL_PRICE)   
Date: 12/20/16   Time: 16:09  
Sample: 2000 2015   
Exogenous variables: None   
User-specifiedlags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.44397  0.0000  5  65 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  28.5843  0.0015  5  65 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  46.5007  0.0000  5  70 
     
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(M2)   
Date: 12/20/16   Time: 16:05  
Sample: 2000 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individualeffects, individuallinear trends 
User-specifiedlags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -6.14226  0.0000  5  65 
Breitung t-stat -1.86444  0.0311  5  60 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.54554  0.0000  5  65 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  38.1602  0.0000  5  65 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  77.7335  0.0000  5  70 
          
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
   
15 
 
 
Annexe 2: Panel VAR-Granger causality Wald test 
Equation/Excluded   chi2 df Prob 
oilprice GGDP 2,418 1 0,12 
INFL 8,947 1 0,003 
M2 2,161 1 0,142 
ALL 17 3 0,001 
GGDP oilprice 1,024 1 0,311 
INFL 0,213 1 0,644 
M2 0,356 1 0,551 
ALL 1,352 3 0,717 
INFL oilprice 1,132 1 0,287 
GGDP 0,934 1 0,334 
m2 1,503 1 0,22 
ALL 3,105 3 0,389 
M2 oilprice 7,568 1 0,006 
GGDP 0,053 1 0,818 
INFL 1,011 1 0,315 
ALL 8,305 3 0,04 
 
Annexe 3: Panel Vector Autoregression (GMM estimation) 
  L1. Coef.        Std. Err.   z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
oilprice oilprice      .991073        .1817967 5,45 0.000 .6347581 1.347388 
GGDP     -.2978365        .191518 -1,56 0.120 -.6732048 .0775318 
INFL     -1.999249       .6683857 -2,56 0.003 -3.30926 -.6892367 
M2     -2.722157      1.851696  -1,47 0.142 -6.351414 .9071008 
GGDP          oilprice     -.050563        .0499574 -1,01 0.311 -.1484777 .0473517 
GGDP      .4635038         .1740421 2,66 0.008 .1223876 .8046201 
INFL     .1162443         .2518354 0,46 0.644 -.377344 .6098326 
M2      .2344472        .3928493 0,6 0.551 -.5355233 1.004418 
INFL          oilprice     .0411436         .0386783 1,06 0.287 -.0346644 .1169517 
GGDP       .038541         .0398854 0,97 0.334 -.039633 .1167149 
INFL     -.1103765       .1762883 -0,63 0.531 -.4558953 .2351422 
M2     -.4259941        .3474316 -1,23 0.220 -1.106947 .2549592 
M2            oilprice     .0430068        .0156337 2,75 0.006 .0123654 .0736483 
GGDP      .0055645         .0242345 0,23 0.818 -.0419343 .0530632 
INFL      .0597116         .0593917 1,01 0.315 -.0566939 .1761172 
M2      .8072593        .1405489 5,74 0.000 .5317885 1.08273 
 
Annexe 3: Response variable and forecast horizon 
 Response variable and forecast horizon 
    impulse variable 
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oilprice GGDP INFL M2 
oilprice 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 
2 .8978778 .0053333 .0745763 .0222126 
3 .8346815 .0133794 .1019746 .0499645 
4 .7846813 .0193035 .1162055 .0798097 
5 .7457001 .0226544 .1235611 .1080845 
6 .7190945 .0239403 .1260716 .1308936 
7 .7057981 .0239276 .1252134 .1450609 
8 .7039962 .0234525 .1227213 .1498299 
9 .7089102 .0231763 .1203021 .1476115 
10 .7150543 .0233783 .1190008 .1425666 
GGDP 0 0 0 0 0 
1 .013128 .986872 0 0 
2 .0329328 .963387 .002255 .0014251 
3 .05029 .9387494 .0060088 .0049518 
4 .0602804 .9204852 .0094463 .009788 
5 .0637276 .9098835 .0116871 .0147018 
6 .0638682 .9047521 .0127054 .0186744 
7 .0638477 .9020173 .0129293 .0212058 
8 .0654776 .8992737 .0128903 .0223584 
9 .0689943 .8954341 .0129823 .0225893 
10 .073538 .890632 .0133591 .0224709 
INFL 0 0 0 0 0 
1 .0007111 .0099993 .9892896 0 
2 .0415465 .0240811 .906401 .0279715 
3 .0478949 .024275 .877414 .0504161 
4 .0470781 .0239207 .8639327 .0650685 
5 .0530775 .0236785 .8513259 .071918 
6 .069074 .0235808 .8344397 .0729055 
7 .0909836 .0237664 .8141103 .0711397 
8 .1124566 .0242415 .7939152 .0693868 
9 .1288868 .0248659 .7771369 .0691103 
10 .1387492 .0254625 .7653168 .0704714 
M2 0 0 0 0 0 
1 .0119416 .0785761 .0037555 .9057269 
2 .0975508 .0614546 .021074 .8199206 
3 .3235916 .0499264 .015244 .611238 
4 .5124594 .0441101 .0273839 .4160466 
5 .6129952 .0428104 .0467568 .2974375 
6 .6516562 .0437013 .0646899 .2399526 
7 .6570356 .045243 .0785435 .2191778 
8 .6470363 .0466494 .0880173 .2182971 
9 .6324363 .0475542 .0934933 .226516 
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10 .6199761 .0478455 .0956858 .2364927 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
